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REVIVAL OR REVOLUTION:
U.S. TRUSTS ROLE IN THE
CONTRACTS CLAUSE CIRCUIT SPLIT
MICHAEL CATALDOt
The Contracts Clause' of the United States Constitution is
one of the only protections against state interference with
contractual obligations.2 The Clause, adopted to restore the
sanctity of contracts and stabilize commercial markets, was once
a forceful weapon against state power.' However, decade after
decade of exceptions nearly exiled the doctrine into constitutional
anonymity. The Supreme Court attempted to revitalize the
doctrine in the 1970s, but instead only muddled the application
of the Clause and left questions about its proper role.5
As it stands today, the Contracts Clause is a recurring
source of confusion and ambiguity. Litigants are unsure of the
scope of the Clause's power, and the circuits are equally
uncertain of the true effect the Clause deserves. The Contracts
Clause violation test is now the subject of a circuit split that has
spawned varying approaches and conflicting interpretations.
t Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John's University
School of Law; B.A., 2010, Adelphi University.
The Contracts Clause states,
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
2 Contracts Clause jurisprudence reveals two different names used to refer to
the clause: the "Contract Clause" and the "Contracts Clause." For the sake of
uniformity and consistency, this Note refers to the provision as the "Contracts
Clause."
3 BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION xiii (1938).
4 James W. Ely Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON
L. REV. 371, 376 (2010).
6 Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the
Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 598-99
(1987).
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This split is best explained by the Supreme Court's failure to
communicate a clear violations test in U.S. Trust Co. of New York
v. New Jersey.'
U.S. Trust was supposed to be the savior of the Contracts
Clause, breathing new life into the feeble doctrine and restoring
it to its past glory.' Instead, the holes and ambiguities created
by U.S. Trust have left the circuits wondering about the Clause's
proper place, and have allowed courts to fill these holes with
their own views of the Clause's power. U.S. Trust's failure to
adequately define the proper role of the Contract Clause has left
the circuits with too little guidance and too much discretion.
This ill-fated combination has allowed the courts to construct
individual interpretations that have generated the circuit split
before us today.
This Note argues that U.S. Trust's Contracts Clause test
created ambiguities that have spawned varying and conflicting
approaches in the circuits. This Note also argues that U.S.
Trust's failure to advance the Framers' original intent and
departure from precedent has created the doctrinal disagreement
that feeds the circuit split. Part I presents the history of the
Contracts Clause from the Constitutional Convention up to the
decision in U.S. Trust.8 Part II emphasizes the negative
consequences of U.S. Trust's novel approach by detailing the
varying approaches the circuits have taken in applying the
ambiguous dual standards set out in U.S. Trust. Part III
critically analyzes U.S. Trust's new violations standard and
argues the Supreme Court needs to resolve the circuit split by
reformulating U.S. Trust's test. This Part then offers a new test
that will clarify U.S. Trust's ambiguities and correct its flaws.
I. CONTRACTS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The history of the Contracts Clause can be divided into four
periods. The first period includes the introduction of the
Contract Clause at the Constitutional Convention and its early
interpretation by the Supreme Court.' The second period
includes the circumstances leading up to the "death" of the
Contracts Clause, illustrating the slow decline of its once robust
6 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
7 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 607-08.
See infra Part I.
9 See infra Part I.A.
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power. o The third period includes the death of the Contracts
Clause at the hands of the Supreme Court." The fourth and
final period centers on the Supreme Court's decision in U.S.
Trust and its revival of the lifeless Contracts Clause.12
A. The Formation and the Early Years
The Clause's original task was to restore stability,
prospectivity, and sanctity to contracts by preventing the states
from interfering with private contractual obligations.1 The need
for such protection arose from the barrage of state legislation
aimed at debtor-creditor relations following the Revolutionary
War.14 States continually passed legislation that freed debtors
from their debts or denied creditors the means to enforce their
liens. When the failures of the Articles of Confederation forced
the Framers to convene and develop the Constitution, the
development of the Contracts Clause was set in motion. "
The Contracts Clause was originally based on the
Northwestern Ordinance of 1787 ("Northwest Ordinance").17
Although the Northwest Ordinance was limited to state
interference with private contracts, the Framers eschewed any
reference to "private contracts" in the Clause." Because the
10 See infra Part I.B.
n See infra Part I.C.
12 See infra Part I.D. This Note does not analyze or discuss any of the various
Supreme Court decisions after U.S. Trust, because U.S. Trust was the last Supreme
Court decision to deal with a public contract impairment Although there have been
numerous Supreme Court decisions regarding private contracts, they are not
analyzed here mainly because the circuit court cases involved in the circuit split
naturally have involved public contracts and thus have not relied on these private
contract cases.
13 Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 372.
14 Id.
15 See id.; see also Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause:
A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 533 (1987).
16 See Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 372-73.
17 "[N]o law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall,
in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements,
bona fide, and without fraud previously formed." NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787
art. II (1787); see also Merrill, supra note 5, at 600.
8 See Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 530-32 (discussing the Framers'
intent for the Clause to touch private and public contracts, unlike the Northwest
Ordinance). It is speculated, however, that the Framers still believed the Clause
only addressed private contracts. Some commentators argue that the lack of debate
over the Clause shows that the Clause was not aimed at a state's own obligations, as
the repayment of the states' mounting debt was a hot-button issue and if state
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Clause received very little debate during the ratification process,
its true meaning is not clear.'9 While the ratification process
shed little light on the explicit meaning of the Contracts Clause,
the Supreme Court gladly filled these ambiguities with its own
interpretations.
The Marshall Court first interpreted the Clause and marked
the apex of the Clause's power. During Chief Justice Marshall's
tenure, the Clause became a "muscular restraint on state
authority.""o Chief Justice Taney continued to augment the
Clause's power, but also narrowed its scope.2 Taney "vigorously
applied" the Clause to debtor-relief laws, state tax exemptions,
and bond repudiations, but conversely afforded the states greater
freedom to set economic policy.2 2 This leeway given to the states
to set economic policy marked the onset of the steady reduction of
the Clause's power, as the Court would continue to carve out
exceptions to the doctrine.
The trend toward carving out exceptions began in Ogden v.
Saunders2 3 and continued steadily on afterwards. In Ogden, the
Court held that the State could impair contracts only if the
impairment occurred prospectively, not retrospectively.2 4 The
majority found that the inclusion of the Clause alongside ex post
facto laws 25 and bills of attainder2 6 implied that the Clause was
meant to protect existing rights only.27 This greatly limited the
scope of the Contracts Clause, as it now only protected actual
contractual obligations, not the "right" to contract.2 8  This
limitation solidified the end of the expansion of the Clause's
power and ushered in the era of the Clause's decline.
representatives believed the Clause would address the issue, there certainly would
have been more vocal debate over the Clause. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 600-01.
'9 Merrill, supra note 5, at 600.
2o Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 374.
2 Id.
22 Id. at 374-75.
23 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
24 See id. at 262.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
26 Id.
27 Ogden, 25 U.S. at 286.
2' Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 537-38.
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B. The Slow Decline
The slow ebb of the Contracts Clause's power began in
Ogden and was expedited by West River Bridge Co. v. Dix."
There, the Court found that some state power was beyond the
reach of the Clause, as "every contract is made in subordination
to [the state right of eminent domain]."30 The Court reasoned
that the power of eminent domain was written into all contracts,
as it is "superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of
the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community."3' Eminent
domain was the first power deemed beyond the reach of
Contracts Clause review, but it would not be the last power put
into this category.
The Court dealt another blow to the Clause's power in Stone
V. Mississippi.3 The Court created an exception for a state's
police power, holding that a state could not contract away its
power to protect society's health and morals; any attempt to do so
would render the contract void. This holding created what
would become the reserved powers doctrine.34 This doctrine held
29 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
3o Id. at 532-33.
1 Id.
32 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
33 Id. at 819.
34 The reserved powers doctrine is sometimes used interchangeably with the
inalienability doctrine. The inalienability doctrine stands for the proposition that a
state legislature may not contract away certain powers. Although often used as
synonyms, the two doctrines are technically different. There are multiple views of
the differences between the two. One view is that the reserved powers doctrine falls
within the inalienability doctrine, as "reserved powers" are always inalienable
because they are written into every contract and cannot be contracted away. See
Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair Surprise:
Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 398,
423, 427-28 (1993). A second view is that any difference between the reserved
powers doctrine and inalienability doctrine is nominal. See Kmiec & McGinnis,
supra note 15, at 546 n.101 ("While the doctrines of 'reserved powers' and
'inalienability' may indeed be nominally distinct, there has never been any
suggestion that the powers reserved are different from the powers inalienable.
Certainly no case under either doctrine previously suggested that one standard of
review is to be distinguished from another."). The third view is that the reserved
powers doctrine applies to private contracts because these contracts are not made
with the state, but these sovereign powers are "reserved" because they are an
implied term in all contracts. See Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract
Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626 (1980). The inalienable powers doctrine then applies
only to public contracts, because there, a state actually obligates itself. See id. The
state retains its sovereign powers here, but the powers are considered inalienable
because the state cannot actually contract them away. See id. Because Contracts
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that states had some sovereign powers that were "reserved" and
could not be contracted away." The Supreme Court increased
the severity of this limitation in later decisions, as it continually
expanded the scope of the states' police powers.3 6 These
exceptions greatly accelerated the decline of the Contracts
Clause's power, as it now was insufficient to invalidate any state
action taken in the name of public health or morals.
By the mid-twentieth century, the Contracts Clause's decline
was in full effect. Between 1941 and 1977, the Supreme Court
did not invalidate any legislation under the Contracts Clause.
Furthermore, the Court, in Manigault v. Springs, extended the
police power exception to private contracts.39  The establishment
of the emergency powers doctrine4 0 further weakened the Clause,
as the Court held that contracts were subordinate to the State's
emergency powers. 41  The final blow came in Home Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,4 2 in which the Court further enlarged the
police power exception to cover economic regulation.43
C. The Death of the Clause
The Court's decision in Blaisdell set the standard for a
Contracts Clause violation test that stood for nearly forty years."
The Court held that although a literal interpretation of the
Clause jurisprudence normally employs "reserved powers" as a blanket term for
these doctrines, this Note uses the "reserved powers doctrine" to refer to the
sovereign powers in both public and private contracts.
* See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977); Merrill, supra
note 5, at 604-05.
36 Michael L. Zigler, Note, Takings Law and the Contract Clause: A Takings
Law Approach to Legislative Modifications of Public Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1447, 1452 (1984) ("Legislative actions ... were upheld when the actions had been
taken to abate nuisances, prevent lotteries, prevent the manufacture and sale of
alcohol, and regulate railroad crossings. Thus the Court allowed the state to
abrogate many public contracts in the pursuit of the public health, safety, and
morals . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).
" See id.
38 Ely Jr., supra note 4.
39 199 U.S. 473, 483 (1905); see also Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 387.
40 For more on the emergency powers doctrine, see Roger I. Roots, Government
by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the New Deal Constitution, 33
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 269-71 (2000).
41 See Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 387-88 & nn.117-18.
42 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
a Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 389-90.
" Zigler, supra note 36, at 1454-55 (explaining the new standard set forth by
U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977)).
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Contracts Clause appeared to proscribe any impairment of
contractual obligations, "the prohibition [was] not an absolute
one and [was] not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula."4 5 This decision solidified the idea that
the Contracts Clause does not invalidate all impairments of
contracts.
The Court continued to assault the Clause in its reserved
powers analysis. The Court held that a state "continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people."4 6
The Court reasoned that it did not matter if the legislation had
"the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect,"
as "the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is . .. read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order."" The
Court rooted this reasoning in precedent, stating that the
"principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the
necessary residuum of state power has had progressive
recognition in the decisions of this Court."4 8
The Court then explained how to apply the doctrine. A court
first must ask "whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and
appropriate to that end."49 The Court then clarified this
statement: "[T]he state power may be addressed directly to the
prevention of the enforcement of contracts only when these are of
a sort which the Legislature in its discretion may denounce as
being in themselves hostile to public morals, or public health,
safety, or welfare . . . ."'o The Court limited the scope of this
directive, stating the reserved powers doctrine does not allow
"the state to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the
destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them.""
In sum, Blaisdell held that a state may impair contracts
under its reserved powers only when it seeks to prevent the
enforcement of a contract that is hostile to public welfare or
safety. Blaisdell did not address whether economic interests are
included in the powers protecting the public welfare. The Court
did find that "economic interests of the state may justify the
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 428.
6 Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
4 Id.
4 Id. at 438.
o Id.
51 Id. at 439.
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exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power
notwithstanding interference with contracts."52 The Court,
however, was dealing with an economic emergency in Blaisdell,
thus narrowing the scope of its previous statement." The Court
also explicitly stated that the reserved powers could not be
construed to allow a state to repudiate its debts.5 4 Blaisdell did
uphold the economic legislation at issue in the case, but the
heavy focus on the emergency remedied left questions about the
status of economic legislation under the reserved powers
doctrine.
The impermanence of the legislation and the emergency it
remedied were two of the five criteria Blaisdell relied on to
uphold the State's act.55  Another criterion was that the
legislation had a legitimate purpose because it intended to
protect the basic interests of society, not advantage specific
individuals." The third and fourth criteria supported the
reasonableness of the act's relief." Although Blaisdell initially
was criticized,' it eventually became the standard for
determining a Contracts Clause violation. 9
The New Deal continued Blaisdell's assault on the Contracts
Clause. In reviewing actions taken under the New Deal, the
Supreme Court afforded significant deference to state legislative
judgments on economic policy and favored a broad regulatory
power.o More importantly, the Supreme Court abandoned the
principle that Contracts Clause exceptions were only applicable
in emergencies.6 ' The Contract Clause soon became "one of the
banished provisions compromising the Constitution-in-exile,"62
functioning as no more than" 'a pale shadow of its former self.' "63
Although the Contracts Clause would remain virtually dead-
letter law until the U.S. Trust opinion, the Supreme Court's
decisions after Blaisdell underscored the correct violations
.2 Id. at 437.
' Id. at 444-45.
54 Id. at 439.
6 Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 543.
6 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445.
5 Id.; see Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 543.
* Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 388-89.
5 Id. at 388.
'0 Id. at 391.
61 Id.
12 Id. at 371.
' Id. (quoting Merrill, supra note 5, at 598).
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standard. City of El Paso v. Simmons 64 dealt with a public
contract impairment and elucidated the test required by
Blaisdell. The Court cited Blaisdell's rhetoric on the reserved
power doctrine' 5 and followed Blaisdell's general approach.6
Like the Blaisdell Court, the El Paso Court found no distinction
between private and public contracts in its reserved powers
analysis and did not communicate any dual deference standard.6 7
The precedent that the El Paso Court relied on for support is
also significant. The El Paso Court's validation of the State's
action was rooted in East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn's"
principle of respecting the wide discretion of a legislature. 69 East
New York involved a private contract dispute,70 yet the El Paso
Court still relied on it in a public contract dispute. Moreover,
the East New York Court relied on the public contract analysis
from Blaisdell72 to assess the private contract impairment, but
made no mention of a different analysis due to this disparity.73
The fact that the Court assessed the Contracts Clause in El Paso
and East New York with no regard to any public versus private
distinction evidences the unified standard employed before U.S.
Trust.
D. U.S. Trust and the Revival of the Contracts Clause
Roughly ten years after El Paso, the Supreme Court gave
new life to the Contracts Clause in United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey.74 U.S. Trust involved an impairment of a public
contract: the repeal of a statutory covenant between New Jersey
and holders of Port Authority bonds.75  The Court quickly held
that the State's repeal had impaired its contractual obligations,
" 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
65 Id. at 508 ("[T]he reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.").
' El Paso attempted to square the State's reserved powers with the
impairment, evaluated the legislation's purpose, and assessed the means taken. See
id. at 508-17.
67 See generally id.
68 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
" El Paso, 379 U.S. at 508-09 (quoting E. N.Y. Say. Bank, 326 U.S. at 232-33).
70 E. N.Y. Say. Bank, 326 U.S. at 232.
" El Paso, 379 U.S. at 498.
72 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
* See generally E. N.Y Say. Bank, 326 U.S. 230.
1 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
7 Id. at 3, 9-10.
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but found that an impairment alone was not enough for a
violation, as courts must then ask if the impairment was
constitutional. The Court then reviewed the longstanding test
to determine the constitutionality of an impairment, yet
curiously adopted its own novel approach.
The Court enunciated a two-prong test to assess an alleged
violation of the Clause. First, was there a substantial
impairment of contractual obligations?78  Second, was this
impairment constitutional?79 This second prong involved two
sub-inquiries: The Court first asked if a state's reserved powers
were implicated, and then if the impairment was "reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose."" This novel
approach included two vague dual standards that reduced the
deference accorded to a state in a public contract impairment.8 '
The Court employed the first of these dual standards in the
reserved powers analysis, where it created two different
approaches for public and private contracts.8 2
1. The Reserved Powers Analysis: Private Contracts
The Court began its dual approach to the reserved powers
question by first addressing private contracts. The Court found
that states "must possess broad power to adopt general
regulatory measures without being concerned that private
contracts will be impaired," as otherwise, a person could "obtain
immunity from the state regulation by making private
contractual arrangements." The Court limited this broad
power, however, when it held that "private contracts [were] not
subject to unlimited modification under the police power."84
" Id. at 21.
7 Id. at 26-29.
78 Id. at 17, 21.
7 Id. at 21.
80 Id. at 23, 25.
" See id. at 25-26 ("In applying this [reasonable and necessary] standard,
however, complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake.").
8 Id. at 22-26.
a Id. at 22.
* Id. The Court does not explain why it only addresses the police power. The
best explanation is that the police power has traditionally been considered implicit
in every contract, and thus, must be addressed in every private contract analysis.
See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
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The Court then incorporated the Blaisdell standard into its
reserved powers analysis. The Court found that legislation
aimed at private contracts "must be upon reasonable conditions
and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its
adoption.""5 The Court applied the East New York deference
standard, holding that "[als is customary in reviewing economic
and social regulation,. .. courts properly defer to legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular
measure."86 In sum, under the reserved powers doctrine in a
private contract, the legislation must be reasonable and
necessary to achieve a legitimate public purpose.88  A court
should also defer to the judgments of the legislature in its
assessment of the above criteria.8 9  The effect of this deference
cannot be understated, as it effectively allowed the legislature to
offer a defense for its legislation without fear of judicial scrutiny.
The Court then analyzed public contract impairments under a
different lens.
2. The Reserved Powers Analysis: Public Contracts
The Court created its first dual standard when it set forth a
different analysis for the reserved powers doctrine in a public
contract context.o The Court first defined the scope of the
doctrine, finding that a state's police power and eminent domain
power could "not be 'contracted away.' "91 More importantly, the
Court implied that the taxing and spending power was not a
reserved power, as a state could unquestionably enter into
8 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 22.
8 Id. at 22-23. It is important to note that, in communicating this deference
standard, the U.S. Trust court cited the East New York opinion's command for
respect to the wide discretion of the legislature. Id.
8 Although the U.S. Trust court never explicitly titled its analysis as the
"reserved power doctrine for private contracts," this much is implied by its location
in between the Court's general discourse on the reserved powers doctrine and the
Court's explanation of the public contract reserved power doctrine. See id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 The Court expressly created this dual standard when it held that "[w]hen a
State impairs the obligation of its own contract, the reserved-powers doctrine has a
different basis." Id. at 23.
9' Id. This distinction highlights a nuance of the reserved power doctrine. In
private contracts, the powers are an "implied term" because the state is not a party,
while in public contracts, the power must actually be "contracted" away. Id. at 23-
24.
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financial contracts." The Court then established a new standard
of review for when a state does not contract away a reserved
power.
The Court found that even though economic legislation did
not fall under the reserved powers, the Contracts Clause was not
an absolute bar to modification of a state's financial obligations.
Instead, "[als with laws impairing the obligations of private
contracts, [a public contract] impairment may be constitutional if
it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public
purpose." The Court provided no explanation for the shift from
the "legitimate" public purpose for private contract impairments,
to the "important" public purpose for public contracts." After
introducing a dual standard into the reserved powers analysis,
the Court created another dual standard when it used a separate
analysis for the deference question in public contract
impairments.
In addressing the deference question for public contracts, the
Court provided a standard different than the one employed for a
private contract impairment. The Court held that public contract
impairments did not deserve the deference accorded to private
contract impairments, as "complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate
because the State's self-interest is at stake."95 In effect, the
Court filled in the opposite end of East New York's respect for the
legislature's discretion when evaluating an exercise of a reserved
power96 : When a reserved power was not implicated, complete
deference was inappropriate. After the Court concluded its
reserved powers analysis, it began its analysis of the "reasonable
and necessary" prong.
92 Id. at 24. As the Court stated previously, the reserved powers doctrine barred
the State from contracting away its police power or eminent domain power. See
supra note 34.
93 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25.
94 Id. at 22, 25.
" Id. at 26.
9 E. N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945) ("Once we are in this
domain of the reserve power of a State we must respect the 'wide discretion on the
part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary.'" (quoting
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905))).
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3. The "Reasonable and Necessary" Prong
The Court divided the "necessary" requirement into two
levels. First, the Court found that the State's "total" repeal of the
covenant was not "essential," as "a less drastic modification" was
feasible.97 Second, the Court held that the State could have
achieved its goal through alternative measures that would not
impair its contract." The Court explained that a state "is not
completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its own
contracts on a par with other policy alternatives" and cannot
"impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more
moderate course would serve its purposes equally well."99 Thus,
the Court found the impairment was not necessary and then
evaluated the "reasonable" requirement.
The Court grounded its "reasonableness" analysis in the El
Paso holding. The El Paso Court had elaborated on the
"reasonable" standard from Blaisdell and evaluated the
reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.10 0 The U.S.
Trust Court echoed El Paso's rationale that had upheld an
impairment because it was a "reasonable means to 'restrict a
party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract'
when it was adopted."o The U.S. Trust Court found the
impairment here was not comparable to the one in the El Paso
case because the "changes" addressed were of "degree and not of
kind."0 2 The Court thus implicitly defined "reasonable" as an
impairment that restricts a party to the gains expected at the
time of the contract. 0 3  Because the impairment was not
reasonable or necessary, the Court held it violated the Contracts
Clause. 04
" U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-30.
" Id. at 30.
9 Id. at 30-31.
10 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-15 (1965); see U.S. Trust, 431
U.S. at 31.
101 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31 (quoting El Paso, 379 U.S. at 515).
1o2 Id. at 32.
103 See id. at 31-32.
104 Id. This Note has not presented the U.S. Trust Court's discussion of the
"public purpose," mainly due to the Court's cursory treatment of the purpose
question. The Court quickly disposed of the question by finding that mass transit,
energy conservation, and environmental protection were legitimate public interests.
Id. at 28.
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The successful Contracts Clause challenge in U.S. Trust
represented a huge shift in the Clause's jurisprudence. The
Court had reenergized the Clause and pulled it from the depths
of constitutional anonymity. This revival, however, was not
without criticism and resistance. 0 This resistance continues
today, as some circuits have not wholeheartedly accepted the new
challenger-friendly public contract approach and have sought to
manipulate the test back to the traditional state-friendly
approach. 0 6 Conversely, other circuits have zealously accepted
the revival of the Clause and have used the U.S. Trust test as a
harsh weapon against state action.'0 Finally, some circuits fall
in between these two opposite approaches and employ their own,
unique interpretation of U.S. Trust. These varying approaches
have muddled the Contracts Clause landscape and have
generated the current circuit split.
II. NEW LIFE AND NEW CONTROVERSy? THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
THE INTERPRETATION OF U.S. TRUST
The circuit courts have split over the interpretation of U.S.
Trust's violation test in two areas. First, the circuits have varied
in their application of U.S. Trust's "reasonable and necessary"
prong, as some circuits have merged the prong with elements of
past Contracts Clause standards, while other circuits have
employed their own novel interpretations of the prong. Secondly,
U.S. Trust's dual standards have confused the lower courts,
resulting in the emergence of varying, novel approaches to the
deference question and reserved powers analysis. These two
"splits" are exacerbated by the U.S. Trust Court's divergence
from longstanding precedent, as the lower courts are unsure if
they should base their tests upon the traditional "state-friendly"
approach or attempt to apply their view of the "spirit" of U.S.
Trust.
105 Justice Brennan authored a scathing dissent, in which he accused the
majority of "reject[ing] [the] previous understanding and remold[ing] the Contract
Clause into a potent instrument for overseeing important policy determinations of
the state legislature" and "stand[ing] the Contract Clause completely on its head."
See id. at 33, 53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See infra Part II.A-B.
1'0 See id.
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A. The Circuit Courts Have Split over the Application of the U.S.
Trust's "Reasonable and Necessary" Prong
The Court's "reasonable and necessary" prong has spawned
various, conflicting interpretations in the circuits. This conflict is
rooted in both the Court's failure to explain its alterations to the
traditional standard and failure to ground its new "necessary"
requirement in precedent. This has left the circuits unsure if the
U.S. Trust test discarded the previous standard or built upon it.
As a result, lower courts have mixed elements of U.S. Trust's
standard with elements of the Blaisdell standard when applying
the second prong. This "split" over the second prong has not
produced two clear sides, but rather four varying approaches
from just five circuits.
The Sixth Circuit, in Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v.
Pizza,108 produced one varying approach to this second prong.
The court's second prong blended principles of U.S. Trust with
other Supreme Court precedent. The court held that a state
must first proffer a "significant and legitimate" public purpose,
and then the court must determine if "the adjustment of the
'rights and responsibilities of contracting parties [is based] upon
reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the
public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption.' "109
This prong was not the correct "reasonable and necessary"
standard from U.S. Trust, but instead was an amalgamation of
the Blaisdell test and U.S. Trust's second prong. The court
retained the "reasonable" requirement from U.S. Trust, but
replaced "necessary" with Blaisdell's "appropriate"
requirement.1 o The court seemed to use "necessity" and
"appropriate" interchangeably throughout the opinion, despite
the incongruence of these terms.11 ' This unique test evidences
the lower courts' uncertainty over which doctrinal principles to
follow, as the Sixth Circuit blended the U.S. Trust and Blaisdell
tests despite their inherent incongruities.
108 154 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
10o Id. at 323 (alterations in original) (quoting Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v.
Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 (1983)).
no See id. This "appropriate" requirement was originally part of the Blaisdell
test and was replaced with "necessary" by the court. See infra notes 170-71 and
accompanying text.
"' See Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council, 154 F.3d at 323, 325-27.
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The second varying approach to the "reasonable and
necessary" prong comes from the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore."2 Here, the
court proceeded as if it were applying U.S. Trust's second prong,
holding that "a government modification of its own financial
obligations must be 'reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.' "113 The court continued to rely on
U.S. Trust, finding that states must not "'consider impairing the
obligations of [their] own contracts on a par with other policy
alternatives' or 'impose a drastic impairment when an evident
and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well,'
nor act unreasonably 'in light of the surrounding
circumstances.' "114 Despite the court's recitation of the U.S.
Trust rule, its application twisted the U.S. Trust test into a
different approach.
The court found that since "the plan was less drastic than at
least one alternative, additional layoffs, which could have been
more detrimental," the State had not chosen a drastic
impairment over a more moderate course."15 This was a direct
manipulation of the U.S. Trust's "less drastic alternative"
question under the necessary prong, as instead of determining if
a less drastic course existed, the court upheld the impairment
because a more drastic approach existed."' Thus, although the
Fourth Circuit clothed its analysis in the language of U.S. Trust's
second prong, it ultimately twisted the test into its own novel
approach that lowered the hurdle a state needed to clear to avoid
invalidation.
The Ninth Circuit formulated its own version of the second
prong in Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana."7
The court recited the "reasonable and necessary" language of
U.S. Trust, but defined "reasonable" in a unique way."' The
112 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
113 Id. at 1018 (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977)).
114 Id. at 1020 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting U.S. Trust, 431
U.S. at 30-31).
" Id.
116 Compare id. ("[Tihe plan was less drastic than at least one alternative. . .
with U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-30 ("[Ilt cannot be said that total repeal of the
covenant was essential; a less drastic modification would have permitted the
contemplated plan without entirely removing the covenant's limitations ...
117 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
118 See id. at 894-96.
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court held that an impairment is not reasonable if the
impairment addresses a problem that existed at the time of the
contract."i9 This interpretation warped U.S. Trust's expectation
approach, which found an impairment reasonable if it restricted
a party to gains reasonably expected from the contract when it
was adopted.'2 0 The Ninth Circuit's approach narrowed the scope
of "reasonableness" to whether the problem addressed existed at
the time of the contract and did not consider whether that
problem produced unintended effects.12 ' This unique variant on
the second prong made it harder for a state to show its
impairment was reasonable, thus, raising the hurdle to avoid
invalidation.
The "reasonable and necessary" prong from the U.S. Trust
decision has not been applied uniformly across the circuits. The
circuits have produced four different tests because of the prong's
open-ended nature. The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
employ their own variation of the second prong, while the Second
Circuit attempted to stay true to the U.S. Trust Court's original
"reasonable and necessary" prong.12 2  With four different
approaches to U.S. Trust's second prong circulating among the
circuits, it is evident that the test's ambiguity and lack of guiding
doctrinal support has confused the circuits.
B. The Circuit Courts Have Split in Their Interpretation of U.S.
Trust's Dual Standards
The U.S. Trust Court's dual deference standard and reserved
powers analysis has sparked much more controversy among the
circuits than its "reasonable and necessary prong." The root of
these conflicting interpretations is the ambiguity and overall lack
of guidance for lower courts on these two intertwined questions.
Lower court interpretations of this test have shared two
problems. First, many circuits routinely fail to even consider the
reserved powers analysis and, thus, hinge the deference question
on whether the impairment was public or private.12 3 Second, the
119 See id. at 895.
120 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31.
121 See S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 894-96.
122 In Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe, the Second Circuit applied the
"reasonable and necessary" prong with virtually no changes, and thus, that prong of
the opinion is not discussed here. See 464 F.3d 362, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2006).
123 See infra notes 128-30, 135, 137 and accompanying text.
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lower courts have used the "less than complete deference"
standard to apply very different levels of deference. 124 The vague
and discretionary deference instruction has given rise to two
divergent tests in the circuit courts.
1. The High Deference Approach
One approach to the U.S. Trust Court's deference instruction
has been an interpretation favoring states. The First, Second,
and Fourth Circuits have interpreted U.S. Trust's "less
deference" approach to conform with the "old" Contract Clause
principles and afford states a great deal of deference. 125 These
circuits have used this approach to warp the U.S. Trust decision
into a test akin to the highly state-deferential Blaisdell test.12 6
The First Circuit twisted the U.S. Trust test into an
approach highly deferential to the state in UAW v. Fortuho.'2 7
Dealing with a public contract impairment, the Fortutho court
first erred when it gave only one sentence to the reserved powers
doctrine, stating that a court must "reconcile the strictures of the
Contracts Clause" with a states's sovereign power.128  This
statement was little more than lip service, as the court skipped
the reserved powers analysis and instead applied the deference
standard set aside for legislation not passed under reserved
powers.129 The court stated that "[w]here the state is alleged to
have impaired a public contract to which it is a party, 'less
deference to a legislative determination of reasonableness and
necessity is required, because the State's self-interest is at
stake.' "so The court then proceeded to clothe an approach highly
deferential to the State in the language of U.S. Trust.
After reciting the U.S. Trust standard, the court injected its
own subjective belief on the deference question under the guise of
interpretation. The Fortutio court found that although "complete
deference" to a legislature's findings was inappropriate under
124 See Buffalo Teachers Fed'n, 464 F.3d at 369; see also infra Parts II.B.1-2.
125 See infra notes 133, 140, 146 and accompanying text.
126 For a summary of the Blaisdell test, see supra Part I.C.
127 633 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011).
1 Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
*2 This mere "lip service" is implied by the test employed by the court, which
asked only whether there was an impairment and, if so, whether the impairment
was reasonable and necessary. See id.
1o Id. (quoting Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
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U.S. Trust, "less than complete deference" certainly could not
mean "no deference.""'1 Furthermore, since legislative findings
in private contracts are afforded substantially "heightened
deference," a less deferential approach to public contracts must
still yield "meaningful deference."132 The Fortutio court exploited
the ambiguity of the dual deference standard and effectively
applied the U.S. Trust test with the state-friendly principles of
pre-U.S. Trust Contracts Clause jurisprudence.3 s
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the U.S. Trust
deference standard in Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe'13 also
favored the State. Just like the First Circuit, the Tobe court
provided only a cursory reference to the reserved powers
analysis, but failed to apply it.'31 Instead, the Tobe court divided
the U.S. Trust Court's test into three prongs'3 6 and hinged the
deference question on whether the impairment was public or
private.137  The court recognized that complete deference to the
legislature in a public contract impairment was inappropriate,
but reasoned that "less deference" does not equal "no
deference.""' The court reasoned that affording no deference to
the State was the staple of heightened scrutiny review, and no
Supreme Court decision warranted such a review.139 The court
then accorded significant deference to the State and held in its
favor. 4 0 Just like the First Circuit, the Second Circuit twisted
1I See id. at 44.
132 See id. at 44-45.
133 For a discussion of the traditionally state-friendly principles of the Contracts
Clause, see supra Part LB-C.
134 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006).
135 The court referenced the reserved powers doctrine once, stating: "[The
Contracts Clause] does not trump the police power of a state to protect the general
welfare of its citizens .. .. [C]ourts must accommodate the Contract Clause with the
inherent police power of the state." Id. at 367.
136 Id. at 368. The other two prongs of the Buffalo Teachers test were
(1) whether the contractual impairment was substantial and (2) whether "the law
serve[d] a legitimate public purpose such as remedying a general social or economic
problem." Id.
137 Id. at 369 ("Public contracts are examined through a more discerning lens.
When the state itself is a party to a contract, complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the [s]tate's
self-interest is at stake." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 Id. at 370-71.
139 Id. at 371. The court resisted heightened scrutiny, as "[sluch a high level of
judicial scrutiny of the legislature's actions would harken a dangerous return to the
days of Lochner v. New York." Id.
1o Id. at 370-72.
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U.S. Trust's deference standard to reflect the traditional
approach favoring deference to a state's justifications and thus
contributed to the mounting circuit split.
The Fourth Circuit also took up a highly deferential
approach in Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore.'
The Baltimore Teachers court did a better job of addressing the
reserved powers question, but still failed to apply it in the
manner required by U.S. Trust. The court recited the language
of the reserved powers doctrine 4 2 and correctly stated the
doctrine's application to private contracts,143 but inexplicably
failed to apply the doctrine to the public contract at issue.
Instead, the court placed the fulcrum of the deference standard
on the public versus private distinction.
The Baltimore Teachers court let the public or private nature
of the impairment control the level of deference accorded. A
private contract would receive complete deference, while a public
contract would stand on "a somewhat different footing" because
the State's self-interest would be at stake.14 4  The court then
found that although "complete deference" was inappropriate,
"some deference" must be accorded.'4  Although the court did not
explain what "some deference" meant, it implicitly afforded the
State a high level of deference when it upheld the legislation
because it was unwilling to sit as a "superlegislature" and
determine if a more appropriate action existed.14 6 This approach
unquestionably aligned with the First and Second Circuit's state-
friendly interpretation of U.S. Trust.
141 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
142 The court recognized that it must "attempt to reconcile the strictures of the
Contract Clause with the 'essential attributes of sovereign power' necessarily
reserved by the States to safeguard the welfare of their citizens." Id. at 1018
(quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977)).
14 "As where a government modifies a wholly private contract, a government
modification of its own financial obligations must be 'reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.'" Id. at 1018 (quoting U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at
25).
1" Id. at 1019.
145 Id.
'* Id. at 1021-22. "[Elven where public contracts have been impaired [courts
are not required] to sit as superlegislatures, determining, for example, whether it
would have been more appropriate instead for Baltimore to close its schools for a
week, an option actually considered but rejected, or to reduce fimding to the
arts... ."Id.
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2. The Minimal Deference Approach
A second interpretation of the U.S. Trust deference standard
favoring the challenger of the state action has also circulated
among the circuits. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits
automatically applied U.S. Trust's "less than complete" deference
standard to all public contracts. These circuits have construed
that instruction to mean minimal or no deference to the state
legislature's assessments. Furthermore, they have ignored the
traditional approach and constructed their tests to further what
they believe is the "spirit" of U.S. Trust. This has resulted in the
continued invalidation of state action under this hard-line
Contracts Clause interpretation.
The Sixth Circuit aligned itself with this approach when it
interpreted U.S. Trust to favor the challengers in Toledo Area
AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza.4 8 In analyzing a public contract
impairment, the court claimed to incorporate the reserved powers
doctrine, holding that the "essential attributes of sovereign
power .. . necessarily reserved by the states to safeguard their
citizens" were "recognized in the [Contracts Clause's] analytic
framework."'4  Despite this statement, the court applied "less
than complete deference" because a public contract was impaired,
not because the legislative act fell outside of the reserved
powers.5 0
Furthermore, the court offered a hard-line interpretation of
U.S. Trust's "less" deference standard, holding that the court
would not blindly accept the State's proffered justifications as
reasonable and necessary because the State's own self-interest
was at stake.'"' Because of this self-interest, the court held it
"must carefully scrutinize" the legislature's justifications and
subsequently invalidated the State action.' Thus, the Toledo
court effectively translated the "less than complete" deference
command into a "careful scrutiny" standard that afforded
minimal deference. This level of scrutiny took U.S. Trust's
147 Unfortunately, these courts are not split from the other circuits in the failure
to analyze the reserved powers, as all five of the circuits detailed here ignore the
doctrine.
14 154 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
141 Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id. at 327.
"I Id. at 325.
152 Id. at 325-27.
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standard to the extreme and is contrary to the First, Second, and
Fourth Circuit's interpretation of U.S. Trust, as well as the state-
friendly pre-U.S. Trust jurisprudence.'
The Ninth Circuit furthered the split over the U.S. Trust
standard in Southern California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana.15 4
Unlike the other circuits, the Santa Ana court did not even
mention the reserved powers doctrine and ignored its role in
determining the proper deference. The court's deference
approach turned on the public versus private question, as it
claimed that "a higher level of scrutiny" is required when
"legislative interference involves a public rather than a private
obligation."' The court then found that "[clomplete
deference . . . is not appropriate because the State's self-interest
is at stake."' Although the court did not expressly state that
low deference to a state's justifications was appropriate, it
implied such throughout its analysis.
The court commented that since the State impaired its own
contract, the State must bear the burden of proving its
impairment was "reasonable and necessary."5"' The court
described this burden as a "heavy burden" on the State.'5 8 The
court proceeded to invalidate the State action because the
justifications the State offered were not reasonable and not
necessary.15 9 Although the court's interpretation of U.S. Trust is
less obvious, its imposition of a heavy burden on a state to justify
its impairment is akin to affording minimal deference
interpretation. The Ninth Circuit thus sides with the Sixth
Circuit on the issue of deference, further deepening the circuit
split.
The circuit courts have had trouble interpreting U.S. Trust
and applying its violation test uniformly. This has led to varying
interpretations and an expanding split among the circuits. The
most alarming aspect of this split is that it has produced unique,
15 See UAW v. Fortufio, 633 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011); Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v.
Tobe, 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006); Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore,
6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
"5 336 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2003).
"I Id. at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156 Id. at 894 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 Id.
11 Id. at 896.
" Id. at 896-97.
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varying approaches in five different circuits.' The variance in
these approaches highlights U.S. Trust's lack of guidance and
ambiguity. This Note argues that the U.S. Trust opinion has
directly caused the split over the Contracts Clause violations test
by promulgating a novel and ambiguous test that diverted from
longstanding precedent and failed to further the Framers' intent.
Thus, the Contracts Clause violations test must be reformulated
into an unambiguous test that squares the U.S. Trust test with
the traditional principles of Contracts Clause jurisprudence.
III. A REFORMULATED CONTRACTS CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
STANDARD: THE THREE-PRONG TEST
The split that has emerged among these five Circuit Courts
of Appeal displays the outcome of combining the ambiguity of the
U.S. Trust decision with the Supreme Court's failure to
adequately ground its decision in precedent or provide clear
doctrinal support. The divergence from precedent and lack of
doctrinal support has set the stage for conflict over the proper
role of the Contracts Clause. The ambiguous and overly
discretionary test communicated in U.S. Trust has enabled the
circuits to air their subjective beliefs on this question. This
undesirable mixture has muddled the U.S. Trust test and the
Contracts Clause in general.
The Supreme Court should therefore reformulate the
Contracts Clause violation test because it has become
unworkable and has caused a split over the application of the
test. The test has proven to be impracticable for three main
reasons. First, the test fails to further the Framers' original
intent.'6 ' Second, the U.S. Trust Court failed to reconcile the
novel test with well-established precedent.162 Third, the test is
too ambiguous and thereby leaves too much discretion to the
lower courts. 6 3 These three failures have combined to allow the
circuits to proffer their own interpretations of the proper role of
the Contracts Clause, thus generating a circuit split.
160 See, e.g., UAW v. Fortuflo, 633 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011); Buffalo Teachers
Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336
F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2003); Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307 (6th
Cir. 1998); Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir.
1993).
161 See supra Part I.A; see also infra Parts III.A.3-4.
162 See infra Parts III.A.1-2.
163 See supra Part II.B.
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A. U.S. Trust: A Critical Analysis
The most apparent negative consequence of U.S. Trust's
holding-the circuit split-is rooted in the opinion's two
overarching flaws. First, the overall ambiguity and the Court's
failure to clearly express the new standards have given lower
courts too much discretion in applying the test. The courts use
this discretion to turn the test into a vehicle for their own
subjective view on the proper role of the Clause. Second, the
subjective views of the lower courts often clash due to the Court's
failure to square the test with the Framers' original intent and
150 years of well-established precedent.164 This has resulted in a
split between courts that employ the test as a weapon against
state action and courts that turn the test into a state-friendly
analysis more akin to the Blaisdell standard.
The first problem arose when the U.S. Trust Court
communicated a test that failed to further the Framers' original
intent behind the Clause. The Framers intended the Clause to
promote prospectivity and restore stability to contracts.'6  The
U.S. Trust decision failed to stabilize contractual relations
between states and private parties when it introduced a
violations standard that gave lower courts significant discretion
in assessing the constitutionality of an impairment. 66  This
resulted in varying and conflicting approaches to the violations
test. Furthermore, the Court failed to further the prospectivity
of the contracts when it introduced vague standards susceptible
to multiple, conflicting interpretations.'6 ' Although the effect of
failing to further the Framers' intent is less tangible, the
inconsistencies nonetheless have forced the lower courts to
choose sides.
The second problem arose when the U.S. Trust Court
introduced a completely novel approach to the Contracts Clause
and turned nearly 150 years of well-established precedent on its
head. Although the Court was well within its power when it
reformulated the Contracts Clause violations test, its failure to
address the traditional principles and precedent left lower courts
with questions about the true meaning of the U.S. Trust test.'6 8
1" See supra Parts L.A-C., II.A.
165 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
'n See supra Part I.D.1-3.
16 See supra Part II.B.
'e See supra Part II.
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This departure from precedent split the lower courts into two
conflicting sides: The courts agreeing with the modern, stronger
Contracts Clause, and the courts loyal to the traditional state-
friendly, weak Clause.
1. U.S. Trust Diverged from Precedent with Its Second Prong
The Court diverged from well-established Contracts Clause
precedent when it altered the language of the Blaisdell
"reasonable and appropriate" standard. The Court made two
significant alterations to the then-current violations test. The
first was the change of the modifier before "public purpose" from
"legitimate" to "important."''6  This alteration significantly
increased the hurdle a state must clear to avoid invalidation.
The Court did not explain this change and provided no support
for the change, despite the fact that a state now had to show its
public purpose was not just genuine but also important. This
modification was too significant to be left unexplained and
unsupported, as it significantly increased a court's discretion in
deciding the validity of a state's purpose and allowed it to
evaluate the importance of that purpose.
The second alteration was the requirement that the
impairment be "necessary" to attain "an important public
purpose," instead of just "appropriate."170 The effect of the
"necessary" requirement as opposed to the "appropriate"
requirement was significant, as it increased the difficulty of
defending a Contracts Clause challenge. This shift meant that a
state was now required to show that the impairment was
virtually its only choice, instead of just having to show that the
impairment was a suitable choice under the old Blaisdell
standard.17' Despite these harsh effects, the Court again did not
explain why it was raising a state's hurdle for constitutionality.
16 Compare U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977), with Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1934).
170 Compare U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25, with Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
1I Furthermore "appropriate" usually denotes a minimal scrutiny standard that
is highly deferential to the legislature's assessments. See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 54
n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Reasonableness generally has signified the most
relaxed regime of judicial inquiry."); Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 546 ("A
reasonableness test is a fairly relaxed or minimal standard of constitutional
review ... .). Conversely, "necessary" denotes a heightened scrutiny standard that
affords almost no deference to the legislature's justifications. See U.S. Trust, 431
U.S. at 54 n.17 ("[T]he element of necessity traditionally has played a key role in the
most penetrating mode of constitutional review."); Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note
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More alarmingly, the Court failed to provide relevant
precedential support for this significant divergence from
Blaisdell. The Court supported its new "necessary" requirement
with one citation to City of El Paso v. Simmons that failed to
support its assertion.172 The El Paso Court did not require the
legislation to be "necessary" to be constitutional; it only found
that the legislation was constitutional because it was
necessary.17 3 The U.S. Trust Court's sole reliance on El Paso was
thus unfounded, and only further weakened the doctrinal support
behind its new second prong.
Although the U.S. Trust Court only made two alterations to
the Blaisdell standard, these two alterations had resounding
effects on the Contracts Clause test. Most importantly, the
changes turned the state-friendly Blaisdell test into a potent
weapon against state action. This radical doctrinal shift left
lower courts confused over the principles underlying the test,
leading to conflicting approaches among the circuits.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Trust decision initiated another shift
from precedent when it created two dual standards separating
public contracts from private contracts.
2. U.S. Trust Diverted from Precedent with Its Dual Standard
U.S. Trust's introduction of the two dual standards that split
the reserved powers analysis and deference question flipped
nearly 150 years of precedent on its head. The Court departed
from precedent in this context in two ways. First, the Court's
two dual standards ignored the traditional approach of a unified
analysis for both public and private contracts. Second, the dual
standards protected public contracts more than private contracts
despite the Court's established tradition of carving out exceptions
to decrease protection for public contracts.
15, at 546 (stating that "formulations employing necessity have been viewed as
calling forth a more exacting standard.").
172 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 30-32 (majority opinion).
See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 516-17 (1965) ("[A] statute of
repose was quite clearly necessary .... The Contract Clause does not forbid such a
measure.").
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a. Precedent Calls for a Single Approach to Both Public and
Private Contract Impairments
The traditional violations test employed one standard for
both public and private contract impairments. Support for this
idea can be traced all the way back to the Marshall Court's
seminal decision in Fletcher v. Peck."' In that public contract
dispute, Marshall expressly stated that the Contracts Clause
protected public and private contracts equally.15  The Court
rooted its holding in the Constitution, finding that the language
of the Clause drew no distinction between public and private
contracts.' The U.S. Trust Court thus rebuffed the Marshall
Court's vision of the Clause when it installed a dual standard
distinguishing private contracts from public contracts.
The Supreme Court's decisions prior to U.S. Trust also
support a unitary approach."' First, the Blaisdell decision
offered a violations test without any regard to the public or
private nature of the contract and rooted this approach in a great
deal of precedent. The Blaisdell Court undertook an exhaustive
review of Contracts Clause jurisprudence yet found no difference
in the analysis of public and private contracts. " More
specifically, the Court explicitly held that the reserved powers
were read "into all contracts, whether made between states and
individuals or between individuals only.""' Furthermore, the
Court continued to support its analysis with both public and
private contract cases without noting any distinction.8 0
The Supreme Court's later decisions interpreting Blaisdell
provide more support for a single standard. The Court first
interpreted Blaisdell in East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn."'
174 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
76 Id. at 137-39.
176 Id.; Merrill, supra note 5, at 603.
177 There is a significant amount of precedent between the Fletcher decision and
the Blaisdell opinion. Presenting a summary of this jurisprudence would be an
exercise in redundancy, as Blaisdell exhaustively reviewed the vast body of
Contracts Clause law before describing its test. Thus, Blaisdell's test is an adequate
representation of this history. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 427-42 (1934).
178 See id.
179 Id. at 435 (emphasis added) (quoting Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of
Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 692 (1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1so For an example of the private contract precedent cited, see id. at 437 (citing
to Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905)).
181 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
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East New York was a private contract dispute, yet the Court fully
relied on Blaisdell-a public contract dispute-without any
mention of a dual standard.18 2 Secondly, the Court in City of El
Paso v. Simmons's8 relied on both Blaisdell and East New York
for support, yet made no mention of a public versus private
disparity." These opinions made no indication of any dual
standard for the reserved powers analysis or the deference
analysis. Thus, the U.S. Trust Court offered an approach never
before seen in Contracts Clause jurisprudence when it separated
the reserved powers and deference analyses for public contracts
from the private contract analysis.185
The U.S. Trust Court effectively admitted there was no
precedential support for its dual standards when it relied on
Fifth Amendment cases for support. The Court relied most on
the Gold Clause1 86 case of Perry v. United States,' which
imposed an analogous dual standard in a dissimilar context."'
The Perry case was a Fifth Amendment case, not a Contracts
Clause case, and thus concerned contractual rights with the
federal government.'8 9 Furthermore, the Perry Court used a dual
standard of review for federal legislation abrogating contractual
gold clauses.'90 More importantly, the Supreme Court completely
1 Id. at 230-32.
' 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
'8 Id. at 508-09.
"' This is not to say there have never been any dual standards implemented by
the Supreme Court. The Court once created an implicit dual standard that required
public contracts to be construed narrowly and against the challenger, while private
contracts were to be construed normally. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
36 U.S. 420, 544 (1837); Merrill, supra note 5, at 604.
1" The Gold Clause cases were a series of decisions surrounding President
Roosevelt's joint resolution that declared all contracts requiring the payment of
obligations in gold to be against public policy. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 605-06.
187 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
1" See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25 (1977) (citing Perry,
294 U.S. at 350-51; Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 304-05 (1935);
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934)).
189 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 607 (explaining that the Gold Clause cases,
which Perry is considered a part of, were decided under the Fifth Amendment).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never "incorporated" the Contracts Clause into
the Fifth Amendment. Id.
190 See generally Perry, 294 U.S. 330 (finding that the plaintiffs claim of a
constitutional violation arose due to a joint resolution of Congress); Merrill, supra
note 5, at 606-07 (stating that the Court "drew a sharp distinction between the
application of the joint resolution to contractual obligations of private corporations
and state and municipal governments, and the application of the resolution to the
obligations of the United States").
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ignored Perry when deciding a public contract impairment in El
Paso v. Simmons,'91 which was decided twenty years after
Perry.'9 2 The El Paso Court applied the Blaisdell principles and
did not even mention Perry's dual standard. 9 3 Thus, the U.S.
Trust Court grounded its support for its dual standard in a
dissimilar and inapplicable case that the Court had ignored in
previous Contract Clause cases.
The U.S. Trust Court also cited to Lynch v. United States,'9
to support its new dual standard. The Lynch decision, however,
similarly fails to provide any support for a dual standard. 95
Lynch was a contract action against the federal government. 9 6
Although Lynch deals with the abrogation of contracts to lessen
government expenditure, it involves congressional spending, not
state expenditure.'97 Because of this distinction, the case does
not contemplate the relationship between a state's spending
power and reserved powers. This dissimilarity diminishes any
support Lynch provided for the U.S. Trust Court's dual deference
standard. The lack of precedential support in U.S. Trust is even
more troubling in light of the Supreme Court's well-established
and contrary trend of creating exceptions to favor the states.
b. Contracts Clause Exceptions Traditionally Favor the State, Not
the Challenger
The Court flouted its long tradition of creating exceptions'
to favor the state when it created a novel dual standard that
scrutinized public impairments more harshly than private
impairments. The first evidence of this trend came in Charles
191 See City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
192 Perhaps more revealing of Perry's inapplicability is the fact that Perry and
Blaisdell were decided only a year apart, yet the El Paso Court relied on Blaisdell
but not Perry.
193 See El Paso, 379 U.S. at 507-08.
194 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
195 U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 n.25 (1977).
196 Lynch, 292 U.S. at 575.
197 Id. at 580 ("But Congress was without power to reduce expenditures by
abrogating contractual obligations of the United States.").
198 The Author will refer to any advantage given to one side in the clause's test
as an exception. Although the dual standard from U.S. Trust is not an "exception" in
the general sense, it is advantageous to the challenger and will be referred to as an
exception. This is done to avoid the confusing problem of having "dual" dual
standards: one set of "dual standards" that differentiate between public contracts
and private contracts and another set of "dual" standards that favor challenger over
the state or vice versa.
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River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.' There, the Court interpreted
the exclusivity of a public covenant.2 00 Taney construed the
covenant in favor of the State, holding that "any ambiguity in the
terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and
in favor of the public, and the plaintiffs can claim nothing that is
not clearly given them by the act."2 01 Charles River Bridge
created the core Contracts Clause principle that courts were to
strictly construe public contracts in favor of the states. 202 This
holding marked the onset of a long line of exceptions favoring the
states.
The most powerful of these exceptions favoring the states is
found in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix. 203 In West River Bridge,
the Supreme Court created the oft-cited reserved powers
doctrine.204  The Court used the doctrine to exclude the State's
eminent domain power from the Clause's grasp, as the power
would be considered either an implied contract term or the
contract would be invalid ab initio because it bound this power.2 05
This holding created an exception that favored the states, as they
could now exercise their eminent domain power without fear of
impairment.
The states would benefit even more when the Court added
the police power to this doctrine. In Stone v. Mississippi, the
Supreme Court held that the State's police power-or the power
over health and morals-was a sovereign power that the State
could not bargain away.206 The Supreme Court continually
19 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
200 See id. at 421 (stating that the plaintiffs claimed right to construct bridges
granted by the Massachusetts legislature was exclusive). For more on Chief Justice
Taney and the Contracts Clause, see Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 374-75.
201 Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
202 Merrill, supra note 5, at 604. Although this principle of construction operates
as a dual standard in some ways, it was not raised by U.S. Trust and is rarely
disputed.
203 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
20 See, e.g., Zigler, supra note 36, at 1451-53.
205 47 U.S. at 532. Practically, the difference between these two methods of
"escaping" review is subtle. A private contract would contain the reserved power as
an "implied term," because the state was not a party to the contract. An exercise of
the "implied" power would not be an impairment because it was "written" into the
contract. A public contract would be invalid ab initio because the state contracted
away a power it was unable to bind.
206 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879). Later courts would clarify and expand this holding,
finding that the police power was implicitly written into every contract as well. See
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
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expanded the scope of the state's police power, thus expanding
the advantages of the exception.20 7 The Supreme Court's addition
of the police power to the reserved powers is another example of
an exception to the Clause that favored the state.
The idea that exceptions usually favor the state is deeply
ingrained in Contracts Clause jurisprudence. Thus, when the
U.S. Trust Court adopted a test that did the exact opposite of this
and installed a dual standard favoring the challenger with little
explanation, the lower courts were understandably confused.
Specifically, the circuits have been unsure if U.S. Trust has
discarded the vast body of precedent that emphasized restraint
when limiting a state's power and instead adopted an approach
that affords much less deference to a legislature's assessments.
Moreover, the U.S. Trust Court's failure to further the Framers'
goals that underlined the Clause amplifies this uncertainty.
3. U.S. Trust's Second Prong Fails To Further the Framers'
Intent
Although the lack of debate over the Contracts Clause
during ratification has created some uncertainty about the
Framers' true intent,208 the circumstances surrounding the
Clause's adoption make at least two purposes clear. First, the
Clause's adoption was an attempt to remedy the mounting
creditor-debtor crisis and restore stability to both state and
national markets.2 09 Secondly, the Clause was meant to insulate
private contracts from the whims of the majority and restore
prospectivity to private contracting. 210 U.S. Trust's second prong
and dual deference standard failed to further either of these
goals, as the abrupt change to the Contracts Clause landscape
destroyed prospectivity and the overly discretionary test
undermined stability.
The first problem with the second prong is that its
"necessary" requirement does not advance the Framers' original
goal to promote stability and prospectivity. For the "necessary"
207 See Zigler, supra note 36. ("Legislative actions abrogating state charters or
other forms of public contracts were upheld when the actions had been taken to
abate nuisances, prevent lotteries, prevent the manufacture and sale of alcohol, and
regulate railroad crossings." (footnotes omitted)).
208 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 600.
209 Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 529; see supra Part I.A.
210 Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 529.
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question, the Court vaguely ordered that if a less drastic
modification was available, the impairment was not necessary.2 1'
Second, if a state could have achieved its aim by taking
alternative measures that would not impair the contract, the
impairment was not necessary.2 12 This standard does provide
some vague outer limits, but leaves the lower courts with
significant discretion in assessing "necessity." Courts are thus
free to subjectively evaluate whether it believes an impairment
was "more drastic" than need be, or if the ends of the impairment
could have been achieved by "alternative" measures that would
not impair the contract.
This format cannot promote stability of contracts or state
markets. The Framers adopted the Contracts Clause to stop
states from enacting individualized credit laws.2 13 Thus the
Framers could not have intended for the lower courts and each
circuit to employ a unique Contracts Clause approach that was
informed by their own subjective beliefs. These unique
approaches would lead to the same inconsistent and unstable
commercial market the Framers sought to remedy.
Furthermore, if courts are able to judge the "necessity" of an
impairment based on their discretion and subjective beliefs, they
essentially hold the power to make a contract worthless. Such a
degree of discretion cannot promote prospectivity, as the parties
will be unable to predict the outcome of a Contracts Clause
challenge, and thus will not be able to rely on current contracts
when planning future acts. The necessary prong of the U.S.
Trust test does not meet the Framers' goal of stability and
prospectivity as the actions, obligations, and expectations of both
the state and private contracting parties will be left to the
discretion of the Court.
4. U.S. Trust's Dual Deference Standard Fails To Further the
Framers' Intent
Similarly, U.S. Trust's dual deference standard does not
further the Framers' goal of preventing state interference with
creditor-debtor contracts. The Framers intended for the
Contracts Clause to preserve the sanctity of creditor-debtor
211 U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977).
212 Id.
213 See Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 372.
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contracts,21 4 which are normally established through private
contracts. It is thus safe to infer that the Framers aimed at least
in part to provide equal-if not more-protection for private
contracts than public contracts. A dual deference standard that
protects private contracts less than public contracts cannot
further this goal; it does not follow that the Framers would want
to protect public contracts more than private contracts when they
specifically adopted the Clause to prevent states from
undermining private contracts.2 15
Moreover, the Contracts Clause was based on the Northwest
Ordinance, which was aimed at private contracts, not public
contracts.2 16 The Framers deleted the "private contract"
language and added the Clause with no distinction between
public and private contracts.1 The Framers' intentional deletion
of "private" shows their desire for one standard; if the Framers
wanted a dual standard, they would have left the term "private"
in the Clause. Thus, the U.S. Trust Court ignored the Framers'
intent when it set forth a dual standard for public and private
contracts.
5. U.S. Trust Failed To Communicate a Clear and Well-Guided
Contracts Clause Test
The final problem with the U.S. Trust opinion is its failure to
express the new standard clearly enough to guide the circuits in
their application of the test. This has combined with the two
problems above to produce conflicting violation tests in the
circuits. The lack of guidance allows the decision's inconsistency
with precedent and the Framers' intent to become a problem, as
courts have exploited the ambiguity to speak their views on the
proper role of the Contracts Clause.
The dual deference standard is ambiguous and thus leaves
too much discretion to lower courts. U.S. Trust orders that
"complete deference" to a legislature is inappropriate in the
public contract context, but fails to elucidate what level of
deference is "appropriate."2 18 Courts have exploited this failure
and warped the test to provide the level of deference they see fit.
214 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 45.
215 See id.
216 See supra note 17.
217 See Kmiec & McGinnis, supra note 15, at 530, 532.
218 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
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Some circuits have interpreted the deference standard to mean
significant, but not quite complete, deference. These courts have
stayed loyal to the tradition of restraint when limiting a state's
power. Other courts have interpreted the deference standard to
mean no deference at all. These circuits have pushed the "spirit"
of U.S. Trust's "less deference" approach to its outer limits. The
ambiguity of the deference standard allowed these two conflicting
interpretations to arise,
In sum, the U.S. Trust Court's failure to address precedent,
to conform to the Framers' intent, and to clearly express its new
Contracts Clause test has given lower courts too much leeway.
The test has become a vehicle for the lower courts' subjective
beliefs rather than the stabilizing force the Framers intended it
to be. The open-ended and discretionary nature of the test has
left it unworkable and necessitates the test's reformulation.
IV. THE REFORMULATED CONTRACTS CLAUSE VIOLATIONS TEST:
A THREE PRONG APPROACH
This Note argues that the only remedy for the troubling
circuit split is for the Supreme Court to clarify the holding of
U.S. Trust and set forth a new, clear violations test. This test
should not simply overturn U.S. Trust, but instead should
attempt to clarify the Court's test and better square it with the
Clause's deep-rooted jurisprudence. Additionally, the new test
should not merely adopt one of the circuit court's interpretations,
as each of the five circuit tests offers no improvement over the
U.S. Trust test, and instead exacerbates its flaws.
The "state-friendly" approach of the First, Second, and
Fourth Circuits is ill-advised because it leaves the Contracts
Clause virtually powerless. This test employs a high deference
standard similar to the standard from Blaisdell, but fails to
retain Blaisdell's "emergency" and "temporary" prongs, which
served as protections of the Clause's power.2 1 9 The test also
manipulates the ambiguity of U.S. Trust's deference standard2 20
to allow the court to afford any level of deference short of
219 The Blaisdell Court upheld the State impairment, but partially due to its
temporary nature and the existence of an emergency. The approach of the First,
Second, and Fourth Circuits fails to include these two important factors. See Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444-48 (1934).
220 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26 (finding that "complete deference to a
legislative assessment ... is not appropriate").
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"complete deference."2 2 1 The test is just as unworkable as the
U.S. Trust test, as it interprets the U.S. Trust test's ambiguity
with its own lack of clarity.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit's "challenger-friendly" approach
falls on the opposite end of the spectrum. These circuits mold the
Contracts Clause into a harsh weapon against state action. The
test exploits the ambiguity of the U.S. Trust's "less than
complete" deference standard and takes it to an extreme by
affording almost no deference to the states' assessments.22 2 This
minimal deference level only magnifies U.S. Trust's inconsistency
with precedent, and thus the Supreme Court should not adopt
this test.
Since both interpretations offered by the circuits are
unworkable and intensify U.S. Trust's flaws, the Supreme Court
should provide a new test. This test will express the U.S. Trust
test in more clear terms and better align the test with the
Clause's established jurisprudence. The first prong will be the
traditional threshold question: Was there a substantial
impairment of contractual obligations? The second prong will
require a reserved powers analysis, and the third prong will
employ a three-part balancing approach assessing the
constitutionality of the impairment.
Lastly, there is no deference standard in this test. This is
because the deference standard was a construct of the East New
York decision that the U.S. Trust Court distorted into a novel
standard. Blaisdell and previous decisions did not apply any
type of deference standard, thus the Court should not provide one
here. The reserved powers doctrine will afford a state the
necessary "deference," as the doctrine will prevent courts from
interfering with a state's eminent domain or police powers. The
proposed test was composed with an eye toward eliminating the
deference question, and thus, the prongs attempt to pose factors
that will not raise a debate over levels of deference and will
remove most of the discretion present in the U.S. Trust test.
221 See supra Part II.A.2.
222 Although neither the Sixth nor Ninth Circuit explicitly states such, the Sixth
Circuit's requirement of "careful scrutiny" and the Ninth Circuit's imposition of a
heavy burden clearly imply as much. See supra Parts II.B.2.
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A. The First Prong
The first prong will present the Supreme Court's traditional
threshold question: Was there an impairment of a contractual
obligation?2 2 3 This prong will exactly mirror the first prong of the
U.S. Trust test.2 2 4 As a threshold question, if this question is
answered in the negative, the court will find no Contracts Clause
violation. An affirmative answer will lead to the second prong.
B. The Second Prong
The second prong is a reserved powers analysis. Most
importantly, this prong requires one reserved powers analysis for
both public and private contracts. The prong will ask if the
contract or impairment involves a reserved power of the states.22 5
The eminent domain power and the police power will be included
under these reserved powers. The police power will include the
power to protect the health, safety, and morals of the public.
There will be no violation if the court finds that the impairment
occurred because a state had exercised a reserved power that it
either contracted away or that was implied in the contract's
terms.
Economic legislation, the taxing power, and the spending
power do not fall under the protection of the reserved powers
doctrine. The Blaisdell Court first brought up this concern when
it held that a state cannot repudiate its debts or deny the means
223 Although there is some debate over whether this prong should require a
"substantial impairment" or just a "technical impairment," this question is well
beyond the scope of this Note and will not be addressed. For more on this debate, see
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The majority's] consideration
of the countervailing injury ostensibly suffered by the appellant is barely discernible
at all. For the Court apparently holds that a mere technical impairment of contract
suffices to subject New Jersey's repealer to serious judicial scrutiny and invalidation
under the Contract Clause." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zigler, supra note
36, at 1456, 1456 nn.54-56 ("Courts had long recognized that if the contract clause
were read literally it would effectively prevent the state from enacting any
legislation at all. Minimal impairments were therefore to be disregarded, and only
substantial impairments were prohibited." (footnote omitted)).
2" The prong mirrors U.S. Trust's version because the merits and wisdom of the
first prong are beyond the scope of this Note. Moreover, the first prong has
generated virtually no controversy and has not contributed to the split.
225 This prong looks to both the contract and impairment so it can adequately
cover private and public contracts. In a private contract setting, the reserved power
will almost always arise in the impairment, since the state was not a party to the
contract Alternatively, in the public contract, the state is more likely to have
contracted away or obligated its reserved power.
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to enforce them.126  Furthermore, the U.S. Trust Court's
skepticism of state legislation that alters the legislation's own
financial obligations was well founded."' As the U.S. Trust
Court wisely argued, the chance for legislative self-dealing
increases when the state's financial obligation is involved, and
the state will always have a need for extra money.228 Thus, when
the state passes legislation pursuant to a power outside of the
"reserved" powers, the court will review the legislation
objectively.2
C. The Third Prong
The third prong of this test will ask whether the impairment
was constitutional. Since this question has been the prime
source of confusion and misinterpretation, a five-part balancing
test will be installed to determine the constitutionality of the
impairment. To meet the goals of reducing the discretion
afforded to the courts, eliminating the ambiguity of the test, and
preventing subjective weighting, the five parts will all be held
with equal weight. This creates an easy and clear procedure that
prevents subjective manipulation: A court must find three of the
factors to be in favor of constitutionality for the legislation to be
upheld, and conversely, three factors must be found in favor of
unconstitutionality for the legislation to the invalidated.
1. The First Factor
The first factor will ask if the impairment impinged on the
reasonable expectations of the party. If this question is answered
in the affirmative, then the factor supports the invalidity of the
impairment. Naturally, if the answer is in the negative, then
this factor swings in favor of constitutionality. Three sub-
questions will help the lower courts answer this question and
eliminate any ambiguity.
226 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
227 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26 (majority opinion) ("A governmental entity can
always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If
a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money
for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause would
provide no protection at all.").
228 Id.
229 Although this review seems to expose the legislation to "heightened
scrutiny," the objective nature of the third prong will not disadvantage the
legislature or set any presumption against the court's decision.
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The first sub-inquiry will ask if the legislation prevented the
party from obtaining a windfall. An answer in the affirmative
supports the argument that the impairment did not impinge on
reasonable expectations. Second, did the impairment restrict the
parties to their reasonable expectations? Again, an answer in the
affirmative supports a finding that there was no impingement on
the reasonable expectations. Lastly, did the legislation aim to
remedy a problem that was foreseeable at the time of the
contract? If the problem was not foreseeable, it supports the idea
that reasonable expectations were not impinged.
The first factor comports with both precedent and the
Framers' intent. This factor adheres to precedent, as it combines
the "reasonable" requirements common to both the Blaisdell and
U.S. Trust testS2 3 0 with factors from the El Paso decision. 23 1
Furthermore, this factor is in line with the Framers' original
intent, as it attempts to protect the expectations of the parties,
thus advancing the goal of stability and sanctity of contracts.23 2
2. The Second Factor
The second factor of the third prong asks if the impairment
was aimed at a legitimate purpose. An answer in the affirmative
will favor constitutionality, while an answer in the negative will
favor invalidity. Because this question naturally may lead a
court to evaluate the policies and decisions of the legislature-an
undesirable result-two interrelated sub-questions supplement
the inquiry. First, did the impairment protect a basic interest of
society? An answer in the affirmative swings in favor of
constitutionality. Second, did the impairment advantage
particular individuals? Again, an answer in the negative will
clearly support the validity of the legislation. These guiding
questions will prevent the lower courts from engaging in any
kind of deference discussion.
230 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 29 ("We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962
covenant if that impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the
admittedly important purposes claimed by the State."); Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438
("The question is . .. whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.").
231 City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965) ("Laws which restrict a
party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract are not subject to
attack under the Contract Clause, notwithstanding that they technically alter an
obligation of a contract.").
232 See, e.g., Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 393.
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This second factor is straight from precedent and advances
the goals of the Framers. 23 3 The factor and its sub-questions are
derived from Blaisdell and have been employed by other courts,
including the U.S. Trust Court.2 34  The second sub-question
addresses a goal similar to the Framers' initial purpose of
preventing states from passing legislation that freed debtors
from their liens-thus advantaging a particular group of
individuals.2 35 This factor also addresses the U.S. Trust Court's
concern of legislative self-dealing, 236 as the test will require that
"target" to be a broad societal interest.
3. The Third Factor
The third factor will ask if the legislature considered other
policy alternatives before choosing to impair the contract. This
factor is a less severe version of U.S. Trust's "necessity"
requirement. To prevent the court from becoming a super-
legislature, this factor only requires a state to show that it
reasonably considered other alternatives. The court will not
weigh whether these alternatives were less drastic or more
appropriate and will accept the alternatives if reasonably
considered. The availability of legislative history, minutes, and
other reports will mitigate the concern that this factor defers to
the state, as the challenger and the court will be able to
determine from these records if the state really did consider the
alternative offered. Obviously, an affirmative response to this
factor supports the constitutionality of the act.
4. The Fourth and Fifth Factors
The fourth and fifth factors are closely related. The fourth
factor comes directly from Blaisdell, and asks if the state aimed
the legislation impairing the contract at an emergency or
237
crisis. Clearly, an answer in the affirmative supports the
constitutionality of the measure. The fifth factor also comes from
that same Blaisdell list of criteria and asks if the legislation is
temporary. Again, an answer in the affirmative supports
constitutionality.
233 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438.
234 See id.; see, e.g., U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 29.
235 See Ely Jr., supra note 4, at 372.
236 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
237 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444-45.
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These two factors are simple, but integral to the balance of
the test. These factors will allow essential legislation to stand. If
legislation truly aims at a crucial end-an emergency or crisis-
it will be temporary to some extent. The legislation will therefore
have the support of two factors, and a court will only need the
support of one of the other three to uphold the action.
Conversely, legislation that is not aimed at an emergency and is
not temporary will have two strikes against it and must survive
the other three factors to be constitutional.2 38 This result
restores the original meaning to the Contracts Clause but with a
new flexibility. The Clause will have enough muscle to
invalidate legislation, but will not strangle the legislature's
ability to respond to emergencies.
B. Application of the New Test
The purpose of the new test is to remedy the ambiguity of
the U.S. Trust test, better reconcile it with precedent and the
Framers' intent, and yet still capture the essence of the U.S.
Trust test. To show that this test achieves these three objectives,
it is necessary to illustrate its application. The test will be
applied to two fact patterns the courts have previously
encountered: the facts before the Supreme Court in U.S. Trust
and the facts encountered by the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore
Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore.2 39 The U.S. Trust facts
will produce the same result that the U.S. Trust Court reached,
but with more clarity and support for its standard. More
importantly, this example will show that the new test is meant to
clarify U.S. Trust and make it more consistent, not overrule or
condemn the opinion. The test's review of the facts in Baltimore
Teachers will produce a result contrary to the Fourth Circuit's
decision. This application shows how the proposed test will
prevent courts from warping U.S. Trust's standard to produce an
inconsistent or unique result.
238 The two factors are not conditional on one another. There can be an
emergency without a temporary act, and vice versa. Also, the absence of one of the
two is by no means controlling on the outcome of the test.
239 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
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1. Baltimore Teachers Under the New Test
The Baltimore Teachers court dealt with a budget plan that
cut the salaries of various public employees. 24 0 The appellants
were public employees who had previously negotiated their
salaries with the City of Baltimore.2 4 ' After Baltimore lost
significant state aid, the appellee, City Council of Baltimore,
responded with budget cuts. 24 2 Under this plan, the appellants
lost two and a half days of pay and alleged an impairment of
their previously negotiated salaries.24 3
a. The First Prong
The first prong asks if there was a substantial impairment of
contractual obligations. This question is answered in the
affirmative. The budget plan enacted by the appellees cut the
appellants' salary by nearly one percent.24 4 There was no
provision in the contract allowing unilateral alterations to the
negotiated salary terms, thus the reduction was an
impairment.2 45 With the threshold question answered in the
affirmative, the analysis moves to the second prong.
b. The Second Prong
The second prong is a reserved powers analysis and asks if
the State implicated its reserved powers. The act here does not
fall into the eminent domain power or police power, as it
addressed a purely financial objective: cutting salaries to save
money.246 Thus, the State's reserved powers are not implicated
and the third prong will be evaluated objectively.
240 Id. at 1014.
241 Id. The appellants, police officers and teachers, would negotiate
compensation with the City Council, who then would enact the terms into law for




245 Id. at 1015-16.
24 Although it seems strange to discuss the State's reserved powers when a city
in the State has acted, no court has addressed this oddity. Both the Fourth Circuit
and the Second Circuit made no distinction in the Clause's application when the
action challenged was an act of a city, not the State. See generally id.
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c. The Third Prong: Factor One
The first factor of the third prong asks if the impairment
impinged on the reasonable expectations of the parties. Three
sub-inquiries guide this question. First, did the legislation
prevent the party from obtaining a windfall? This question is
answered in the negative, as the legislation cut the salary that
the appellants' had bargained for. Second, did the impairment
restrict the party to its reasonable expectations? This question is
also answered in the negative. The appellants' expectation that
the appellees would pay the salary stated in the contract was
reasonable because both parties negotiated and agreed to the
contract. The legislation impinged on these expectations, it did
not enforce them. Third, did the legislation aim to remedy a
problem that was foreseeable at the time of the contract? The
answer here is less clear, as the appellees could argue that they
could not have expected funding cuts when the salaries were
negotiated. This may produce an answer in the affirmative, but
it is moot since the other two factors of this prong discussed
below support the unconstitutionality of the act. Thus, even an
answer in the affirmative would result in this factor supporting
the unconstitutionality of the act.
d. The Third Prong: Factor Two
The second factor asks if the impairment was aimed at a
legitimate purpose. Two sub-questions guide the analysis. First,
did the impairment protect a basic interest of society? The
answer to this is likely yes, as the cuts were an attempt to
generate funds to replace the aid that the State had cut. The
appellees can argue that they needed to replace this aid because
it funded various basic interests of society. If the appellees can
offer any examples, the answer to this question will be yes.
Second, did the impairment advantage particular individuals?
The answer here is no, as the cuts attempted to raise money that
would be spent on the city as a whole. The second factor would
thus support the constitutionality of the act.
e. The Third Prong: Factor Three
The third factor asks if the legislature considered other
policy alternatives before choosing the impairment. The
appellees only need to offer other alternatives they considered to
satisfy this prong. The appellees could argue that they first
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attempted to balance the budget through layoffs, early
retirements, and job abolishments.24 7 The appellees could also
offer their plan to balance the budget in other ways, such as
reallocating other funds and drawing proceeds from property
sales.248 The appellants could argue that the above actions were
not alternatives because they were part of the same budget-cut
plan and thus were acts in addition to the cuts. Since the
impairment involves balancing a budget, the appellees likely
would be able to offer alternatives they considered. Thus, the
third factor supports the constitutionality of the act.
f The Third Prong: Factor Four and Factor Five
The fourth factor asks if the act was aimed at an emergency.
Although debatable, the answer would likely be no. The
appellees could argue that they are required to balance the
budget by law, and thus the deficit they faced was a "fiscal
crisis."24 The appellants could argue that the deficit was not an
emergency, but instead a regular hardship inherent in running a
city. States and cities routinely balance their budgets and deal
with deficits and surpluses. Thus, this was not an emergency, it
was just another choice the city had to make. The court would
likely agree, as balancing a budget is part of a city's everyday
duties and it should not be able to repudiate contracts to climb
out of debt. Thus, this factor supports the unconstitutionality of
the act.
The fifth factor asks if the legislation was temporary. There
is no evidence that the appellees intended to reimburse the
appellants for their losses, as this would defeat the purpose of the
cuts. The appellees could contend that since they stopped the
cuts before the fiscal year end, they were only temporary.2 50 The
appellants could argue that the act was only cut short because
the City Council acquired the funds it needed to balance the
budget. Finding the impairment temporary would allow the city
to cut salaries whenever they needed to balance the budget. This
argument best captures the fifth factor's purpose and will
support the unconstitutionality of the act.
247 Id. at 1020.
248 Id. at 1020 n.12.





The proposed test would result in the invalidation of the
State's action. Three of the five factors supported the
unconstitutionality of the act, while only two supported the
constitutionality. This application emphasizes how the proposed
test prevents courts from exploiting the ambiguity of U.S. Trust
to achieve their desired result. In actuality, the Fourth Circuit
upheld the legislation because it was reluctant to sit as a super-
legislature and evaluate the appropriateness of the cuts. 251' This
example exhibits how the proposed test removes the discretion
and subjectivity from the court's approach and installs a clear,
systematic approach.
2. U.S. Trust Under the New Test
The U.S. Trust Court dealt with the repeal of a covenant
between the State of New Jersey and bondholders. 25 2  The
covenant dealt with the railroad expansion project of the Port
Authority of New Jersey and stated that as long as bonds funding
the project remained unpaid, the State could not fund any
improvements to the railroad using the revenues and reserves of
Port Authority's mass transit system.5 In 1972, the Port
Authority wished to expand the mass transit system.2 54 When
federal funding for the project fell through, New Jersey repealed
the covenant and raised tolls to fund the expansion project. 255
The appellant alleged a violation of the Contracts Clause.2 56
a. The First Prong
Under the proposed test, the first prong would ask whether
there was a substantial impairment of contractual obligations.
The answer here is clearly yes, as the repeal eliminated an
important security provision that the appellant had bargained
for.257 With the threshold question satisfied, the court would
then move to the second question.
251 Id. at 1021-22.
252 See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1977).
25 Id. at 10. This Note refrains from delving into the vast complexity of the
covenant and for the sake of simplicity, has only presented the facts necessary for
understanding the application of the test.
254 See id. at 12-13.
255 See id. at 13-14.
25 See id. at 17.
257 See id. at 19.
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b. The Second Prong
The second question is the reserved powers analysis, which
asks if the State contracted away a reserved power. If the State
contracted away its eminent domain power or police power, the
contract will be considered invalid and thus no impairment could
have occurred. If one of these powers is not implicated, the
State's justifications will be evaluated objectively. Here, the
State argued that it repealed the covenant pursuant to New
Jersey's police power, as it aimed at serving the public interest,
namely mass transportation and energy conservation.2 8 The
court would likely classify the repeal outside of the reserved
powers. 25 9  This is because the repeal was purely financially
driven: New Jersey needed more money to invest into the Port
Authority, and it thus repealed a limitation on its finances.
Since the State did not contract away a reserved power, the court
will review the State's justifications objectively.
c. The Third Prong: Factor One
The first factor asks if the impairment impinged on the
reasonable expectations of the party. Three sub-inquiries help to
answer this question. First, the court will ask if the legislation
prevented the party from obtaining a windfall. This is not the
case here, as the legislation repealed a security provision that
protected the funds needed to repay the bondholders. The
answer in the negative here supports the unconstitutionality of
the repeal. The second sub-inquiry asks if the impairment
restricted the parties to their reasonable expectations. Again,
the repeal eliminated an important, bargained-for security
provision. The State destroyed the parties' reasonable
expectations when it repealed the covenant, as the appellant lost
the security provision that guaranteed repayment. This answer
in the negative supports the unconstitutionality of the repeal.
The third sub-inquiry asks if the legislation aimed to remedy
a problem that was unforeseeable at the time of the contract.
Again, the answer here is likely no. Mass transit had been a
rising public concern since the early twentieth century,2 60 and it
is unlikely the State would not have expected a need to expand.
258 Id. at 28-29.
259 Id. at 23-25.
260 See id. at 31-32.
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The State could argue that it could not have expected the
demand for expansion to be so high. Although this may be a
valid argument, the answer is moot since the first and second
sub-inquiries will support the unconstitutionality of the repeal.
Therefore, the first factor supports the unconstitutionality of the
impairment.
d. The Third Prong: Factor Two
The second factor asks if the impairment was aimed at a
legitimate public purpose. The first guiding sub-inquiry asks if
the impairment protected a basic interest of society. The
contract was impaired due to a repeal that enabled the expansion
of mass transit. Mass transit is a basic interest of society in
itself. It also implicates energy conservation and environmental
protection. An increase in the use of mass transit would likely
result in a decrease of automobile use. This decrease will lead to
less petroleum consumption, benefiting both the environment
and the conservation of energy, thus protecting those two basic
interests of society.
The second sub-inquiry asks if the impairment advantaged
particular individuals. This question is answered in the
negative, since the expansion of mass transit, the protection of
the environment, and the conservation of energy benefits society,
not specific individuals. Both sub-inquiries support upholding
the act, thus the second factor supports the constitutionality of
the repeal.
e. The Third Prong: Factor Three
The third factor asks if the legislature considered other
policy alternatives before resorting to the action that impaired
the contract. Here, the State could argue it did consider other
alternatives when it attempted to raise the money for expansion
from federal aid.26 ' The appellant could argue that this is
irrelevant because the State passed the repeal in response to the
withdrawal of federal funding, not as an alternative to federal
funding. If the State was able to offer a reasonable example of an
alternative it considered, the court could review the legislative
records to determine if the State actually did consider that
alternative. Here, the low hurdle for the State makes it likely
261 Id. at 12-13.
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that the factor will support the constitutionality. The point is
moot, however, since the remaining factors support the
unconstitutionality of the repeal.
f The Third Prong: Factors Four and Five
The fourth and fifth factors often go hand-in-hand and courts
will often analyze them together. The fourth factor asks if the
impairment aimed to remedy an emergency or crisis. This
question is answered in the negative, as the need for money to
expand mass transit is not an emergency. The State could argue
here that there was a declared national petroleum shortage,6
and the impairment remedied this petroleum shortage by
attempting to decrease automobile use. The court could look to
legislative history to determine if an emergency actually spurred
the repeal. Since the repeal was more likely to raise money for
the expansion plan because federal grants fell through, it likely
was not a response to an emergency and therefore supports the
unconstitutionality. 26 3
The fifth factor asks if the legislation or impairment was
temporary. This question is also answered in the negative. The
State repealed its original covenant with the appellant and
installed no mechanism that would reinstate the original
covenant after a certain amount of time.2 M Moreover, there was
no guarantee that the Port Authority would stop using the
revenue to subsidize the improvements once the initial expansion
was complete. The fifth factor thus would support the
unconstitutionality of the impairment.
g. Conclusion
The application of the proposed test to the U.S. Trust
scenario would have resulted in three factors supporting the
unconstitutionality of the impairment and two factors supporting
the constitutionality.265 The result aligns with the actual result
262 See id. at 13-14.
26 Before the federal grants fell through, the State actually had adequate
funding to go forward. See id. at 13.
26 See id. at 14 (discussing the repeal with no mention of reinstatement of the
original covenant).
265 The author assumes the State would be able to offer evidence that it
considered other alternatives to pass the third factor. The first, fourth, and fifth
factors support unconstitutionality, while the second and third factors support
constitutionality.
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of U.S. Trust. This result illustrates how the proposed test
attempts to capture the essence of U.S. Trust, but with
modifications, to remedy the ambiguities and inconsistencies that
rendered it unworkable.
CONCLUSION
The new test for a Contracts Clause violation seeks to draw
on the principles of Contracts Clause jurisprudence and the
original intent of the Framers and seeks to improve a doctrine
that has been misinterpreted and misapplied over the years. The
proposed test does not take the "modern" approach of affording
high protection to public contracts but also does not return the
Clause back to the useless tool it was before U.S. Trust. Both
Blaisdell and U.S. Trust had strengths and weaknesses, thus
evidencing why the middle ground between the two is the best
approach. This test seeks to return the Contracts Clause's power
while still allowing state legislatures to retain their essential
attributes of sovereignty and ability to respond to pressing public
needs.
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